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Abstract
This paper presents more channels through which the optimal patent life is determined in a
R&D-based endogenous growth model that permits growth of new varieties of consumer goods
over time. Its modeling features include an endogenous hazard rate facing incumbent monop-
olists, the prevalence of research congestion, and the aggregate welfare importance of product
diﬀerentiation. As a result, a patent’s eﬀective life is endogenized and less than its legal life.
The model is calibrated to a global economy with a set of baseline parameter values. Under the
benchmark patent length of 20 years, the calibrated model can deliver along the balanced growth
path a plausible innovation rate of 2.84% per year and an economy-wide markup rate of 1.15.
The optimal patent length is computed with the algorithm of Golden Search Section, ranging
from 17 to 19 years. With the creative-destruction hazard, the world needs a longer patent term
to maximize social welfare, but with the prevalence of research congestion, the world needs a
shorter patent term. However, if the world’s aggregate welfare appreciates varieties of goods in
a way strong enough, the optimal patent term can surprisingly extend beyond even 1,000 years!
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1 Introduction
Innovation of new products or production processes is critical to a country’s long-term economic
growth and standard of living. But innovating activities are risky and costly. They would not be
viable if there were no systematic mechanism to prevent free-riders from infringing on intellectual
property rights. To fix the free-rider problem, the patent system has been in place for a long
time in the world.1 It grants the inventor (the patentee) for a limited period of time the exclusive
right to prevent others from making, using, selling, or distributing the patented invention without
permission. The patent term (or “patent length”) determines the duration, or the life, of patents
for which the inventor is entitled to the exclusive right. Today, under the WTO (World Trade
Organization) Agreement on TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), the
length of patents gives a patent life of at least twenty years.2
However, it is well-known that the patent system is merely a second-best policy instrument.
Patents provide the inventor with a purposive incentive to innovate, because a successful innovation
may generate monopoly profits during the patent life. The world’s patent system can therefore
generate dynamic social gains from ongoing technological innovation, but at the social cost of
static ineﬃciency arising from monopoly distortions, as patented objects are often sold at monopoly
prices.3 Thus, by fine-tuning the term of patents, the socially optimal patent life must be such that
balances the dynamic innovation gain against its associated static-ineﬃciency cost. The present
paper formulates more channels through which the optimal patent life is determined for a closed
economy.
In a more general setting than the literature on patent length, innovation, and welfare, this paper
uses a dynamic general equilibrium model where a patent system permits endogenous growth of new
varieties of consumer goods over time.4 In such a model, goods are all horizontally diﬀerentiated
1The world’s patent system can date back to the fifteen century.
2The WTO Agreement on TRIPS was concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) in 1994. It sets down minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property rights.
3In general, the patented object may refer to a final product, an intermediate input, or a production process.
4Following Nordhaus (1969), earlier studies on the optimal duration of patents were confined to partial equilibrium
analysis of one single process innovation, which leads to reduction of marginal production costs. These studies include
Scherer (1972), DeBrock (1985), Gilbert and Shapino (1990), and others. In contrast, Judd (1985) represents the
initial attempt to study the optimal patent length for a closed economy using a dynamic general equilibrium model
where product innovation comes as a stream over time. In Judd’s model, the long-term innovation rate is exogenous
and the optimal patent length is infinite. In contrast to Judd (1985), Segerstrom et al (1990) develop a quality-ladder
endogenous growth model of North-South trade to study the steady-state eﬀects of changing patent length on R&D
incentives, technology transfer and relative wages, but how to optimize the patent length is not answered.
and imperfectly substitutable, and innovation of a new good gives birth to a new firm, which is
granted by the government a patent with a finite term (say, twenty years). Such a patented firm
would continue to be a monopolist, either until the patent it holds has expired or until it has been
forced prematurely to lose monopoly power to newer product innovation. We use the term “creative
destruction of a patent’s monopoly profits” to coin the event of a newer product innovation coming
to force any patented firms to lose monopoly power before their patents expire. We endogenize an
instantaneous hazard rate as an externality of an economy’s aggregate innovating activities, as in
Jones and Williams (2000).5 Following the well-known survival analysis, We use the hazard rate to
derive a survival function that determines the instantaneous probability that an incumbent may get
around the creative-destruction hazard. In the modeled economy, if product innovation proceeds at
a faster rate, any incumbent monopoly firm faces a greater hazard of being “creatively destructed”
at any point in time, even though the firm still holds a legally valid patent.
Thus, with the hazard rate and its associated survival function coming as an externality of
aggregate innovation, any patented firm’s expected monopoly duration is endogenous in the modeled
economy and must be shorter than its patent’s remaining life to maturity at any point in time.6
This important feature distinguishes the present paper from previous studies on patent policy using
R&D-based variety-expansion growth models. For instance, in a class of variety-expansion models
[e.g., Judd (1985), Chou and Shy (1991), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Grossman and Lai
(2004), Futagami and Iwaisako (2007), Chu (2010), and Grinols and Lin (2011)], a patented firm’s
expected monopoly duration is always tied to its patent’s remaining life to maturity, since these
cited studies all presume a zero hazard rate. In another class of such models [e.g., Helpman (1993),
Grinols and Lin (1997, 2006), Lin (2002), and Furukawa (2007)], the hazard rate is an exogenous
5Other works endogenizing the hazard rate as an externality of aggregate innovating activities are mostly quality-
ladder growth models including Grossman and Helpman (1992, ch.4), O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004), and
Iwaisako, et al. (2011), among others. There are also works that endogenize the hazard rate as a purposive result of
profit-driven activities, respectively, in imitation, outbound FDI (foreign direct investment), and rent seeking-cum-
innovation. These related works will be discussed in subsection 2.1.3.
6For illustrative purposes, let the hazard rate of creative destruction stay constant at h ∈ (0, 1) and let the patent
length l be a positive integer on a discrete time axis t = −∞, . . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. Then for an innovative
firm that was granted a patent at time τ ∈ (t − l, t], its expected monopoly-power duration at time t is equal to￿l−(t−τ)−1
s=0 (1 − h)s = 1 + (1 − h) + (1 − h)2 + . . . + (1 − h)l−(t−τ)−1 = 1−(1−l)
l−(t−τ)
1−(1−l) , which is always less than
patent’s remaining life h − (t − τ), provided 0 < h < 1. If the patent length is infinite (l → ∞), then the expected
monopoly-power duration is simply equal to 1/h. The greater the hazard rate h, the shorter the expected monopoly-
power duration. As will be explained in the text, the hazard rate h is positively associated with the rate of product
innovation. Note that in the continuous-time, the hazard rate h is not a probability, and so it does not have be less
than one. This will be made clearer in subsection 2.1.3.
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fraction but patents are infinitely lived. Therefore, any patented firm’s expected monopoly duration
is always fixed at the inverse of the hazard rate at any point in time. In contrast to the two classes
of variety-expansion models, the present study lays out a modeled economy in which the patent
length is finite, the hazard rate is endogenous, and patents are of diﬀerent vintage. Thus, in this
economy, the market value of patents can be determined through more avenues including the cost-
of- capital elements (interest rate, hazard rate, innovation rate) and the patent length, as will be
explained later.
In addition, we introduce another two modeling features. One is to reflect the empirical preva-
lence of research congestion and patent races, for which many potential innovators engage in similar
research projects and the innovator who successfully races to receive a patent may force the other
rivals to abandon in-progress projects, thereby creating wasteful duplication of eﬀort.7 The other is
to capture the welfare implication of “aggregate importance of product diﬀerentiation” by allowing
for a wider parameter space that governs the curvature of flow utility with respect to growth of
available goods.8 Thus, in the present study, the dynamic eﬀects of R&D are more multifaceted:
on the one hand, more active R&D leads to faster product innovation and contributes to the stock
of knowledge capital, but on the other hand, a faster pace of product innovation must raise the
hazard rate (and thereby shorten any patented firm’s expected monopoly duration), create wastes
of duplicated research, and even deepen aggregate R&D intensity.
Another noteworthy aspect of the present paper is that: an ongoing endogenous innovation
process influences the hazard rate, which in turn determines a patent’s eﬀective life. In a sense, the
present paper actually deals with endogenous intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Though
a patent’s legal life is exogenous, its eﬀective life is endogenized by the innovation-determined hazard
rate in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Therefore, this paper is an important supple-
ment to the endogenous IPR literature that focuses on rent-seeking activities; see, for instance,
7See Wright (1983) for an earlier criticism of the patent mechanism that may spur wasteful races.
8In the real world the same good does not always equally contribute to household’s well-being in diﬀerent regions.
To deal with this problem, Grinols and Lin (1997, 2006) use R&D-based growth models to introduce bi-directional
innovation of goods targeted to regional consumers in examining issues regarding North-South protection of intellec-
tual property rights. Daiwan and Rodrik (1991) also address the similar problem, but in a static North-South model.
In the vast literature on patent policy, however, goods are often assumed to be equally substitutable in consumption
or production, regardless of the location of consumers. Thus, social welfare functions used in this literature tend
to overstate the aggregate importance of product diﬀerentiation, if regional consumers actually demand regionally-
diﬀerentiated goods. Following Grinols and Lin (2011), the present study uses a utility function that can discount
the aggregate importance of product diﬀerentiation by adjusting the value of a preference parameter.
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Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007), Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2008), Grieben and Sener (2009),
Davis and Sener (2012).
We calibrated the model of the paper to a global economy with a set of baseline parameter
values. Under the benchmark patent length of twenty years, the calibrated model can deliver along
the balanced growth path a plausible innovation rate equal to g = 2.84% per year, a fraction of
monopoly-supplied (patented) goods about equal to ζMp = 22%, a creative-destruction hazard rate
of h = 2.84.% per year, an eﬀective cost of capital close to 10% per year, and an economy-wide
markup rate of 1.15.9,10,11 Simulations indicate that a minimum patent length of more than eleven
years is required for the world to keep an active R&D sector. If the patent length were set to be
infinite (as opposed to twenty years benchmark), the innovation rate would increase (or less-than-
double) to g = 4.92%, whereas the fraction of monopoly-supplied goods would increase (or more
than double) to ζMp = 50% along with a much greater hazard rate of h = 4.92% and a much greater
eﬀective cost of capital of about 14%. Compared to the 20 years benchmark patent length, the
infinite patent term makes the world worse oﬀ: based on our simulations, the dynamic gain from
faster product innovation is actually dominated by the social costs resulting from increased research
intensity (which calls for a higher saving rate) and increased monopoly distortions. These results
therefore point to a finite patent length that maximizes social welfare in our calibrated model.
The search for such an optimal patent length presents a constrained lifetime welfare maxi-
mization problem.12 We applied an algorithm known as “Golden Section Search” to numerically
solve the maximization problem.13 We found that the world’s optimal patent length equals 18.35
years under our chosen baseline parameter values and that it may range from 17 to 19 years from
9According to OECD’s published annual patent data of 1985 through 2008, the average annual growth rate of the
world’s triadic patent families was about 3%, which may reveal the world’s annual innovation rate in general. Triadic
patent families refer to a set of patents taken from the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO), the Japanese Patent Oﬃce
(JPO), and U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) that share one or more priorities (see Dernis and Khan
2004).
10In the paper we assumed the annual rate of time preference equal to ρ = 4%. Along a balanced growth path, the
cost of capital equals ρ+h = 6.84%. But ongoing product innovation is seen to dilute an incumbent monopoly firm’s
profit flow in a more crowded market. With the steady-state innovation rate of 2.84%, the eﬀective cost of capital is
equal to ρ+ h+ g = 9.68% per year. Detailed derivations are given in the text.
11The economy-wide markup rate is endogenous in the paper. The calibrated model of the paper delivers a markup
rate that falls onto the empirical estimates of 1.05 to 1.40; see Norrbin (1993) and Basu (1996).
12In the modeled economy, the patent length does not directly enter the objective (social welfare) function, but
exerts its eﬀects through a steady-state system of two nonlinear equations, which, however, do not have a closed form
solution.
13The algorithm of golden section search is the counterpart of bisection used in finding roots of equations; see
Kiusalaas (2010, pp. 376-379).
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our sensitivity analysis. Our robustness checks suggest that with the creative-destruction hazard
confronting incumbent firms, the world needs a longer patent term to maximize social welfare.
But with the research congestion eﬀect, the world instead needs a shorter patent term. These
interesting findings make intuitive sense: the hazard of creative destruction reduces a patented
firm’s expected monopoly duration and therefore calls for a longer optimal patent term, while the
research congestion eﬀect raises the social cost of research intensity and therefore calls for a shorter
optimal patent term. However, our robustness checks also demonstrate that the optimal patent
term appears quite sensitive to the aggregate welfare importance of product diﬀerentiation: if ag-
gregate welfare appreciates varieties of goods in a way strong enough, the optimal patent term can
surprisingly extend beyond even 1,000 years!
The paper contributes to the literature on patent length, social welfare, and an aggregate
economy. Its numerical simulations based on a calibrated growth model with expanding variety
stands in contrast to some closely related previous work. The seminar paper of Judd (1985) shows
that the socially optimal patent length is infinite for a closed economy with an exogenous long-run
innovation rate. Chou and Shy (1991) show that a finite patent length may be optimal if the cost
of developing a new product is increasing with the flow of product development. Their model,
however, does not consider household’s intertemporal decisions on saving and investment.14 Using
an endogenous growth model similar to Romer (1990), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) present an
analytic proof that a finite duration of patents can be optimal, while Futagami and Iwaisako (2007)
show that an infinite life of patents is not socially optimal in the absence of the scale eﬀects (Jones
1995). Yet, their works do not quantify the optimal patent length, and do not allow to endogenize
eﬀective patent life, since they assume patented firms can always survive the entire statutory patent
life.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model for a closed economy in
which the representative forward-looking household supplies saved funds to finance R&D (research
& development) and the forward-looking innovators seek to earn their expected intertemporal
profits by engaging in R&D. Section 3 calibrates the model to a global economy and conducts
computational simulations to see how changing the patent length can aﬀect product innovation and
14In Chou and Shy (1991), the interest rate is exogenous, and the profit flow of a patented firm and the value of
patents are both time-invariant in steady state.
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other variables along the balanced growth path. Robustness checks on some structural parameters
are also conducted. Section 4 computes the optimal duration of patents for our calibrated model
using the golden section search algorithm. Lastly, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we develop a dynamic general-equilibrium model for a closed economy, where the
representative household optimizes consumption/saving flows to maximize her lifetime utility under
a dynamic budget constraint. The saving flow is then channeled through financial markets into
profit-oriented R&D activities that introduce newer varieties of innovated goods over time. In this
economy a patent system is in place to protect intellectual property rights to R&D-driven inno-
vations. The government issues patents to protect all innovative goods, so that the patent holder
(or called the “innovative firm”) is granted monopoly power over the sale of its patented product,
but only for a finite period of time stipulated by a uniform patent length l ∈ (0,∞) applicable
to all issued patents. Under the patent system, the patent holder will expectantly lose monopoly
power when the patent expires. But the patent holder may also prematurely lose monopoly power
to newly emerging innovations, even if the patent has not yet expired. This random event, coined
“Schumpeterian creative destruction” in the model, is an endogenous hazard facing all incumbent
monopolists, as will be fully explained later. In what follows we lay out the model where saving
and investment interact in a forward-looking manner to drive product innovation onwards.
2.1 Product innovation and creative destruction
In the model of this paper n[t] denotes the measure of product availability at time t. Out of the
n[t] available products at time t, there are np[t] patented products that received patents previously
on patent-issuance dates τ ∈ (t− l, t] and nnp[t] unpatented products that had completely eclipsed
their term-l patent life. These unpatented products received patents on patent-issuance dates
τ ∈ (−∞, t − l]. At any point in time, it holds that n = np + nnp.15 This equality relationship
is equivalent to ζp + ζnp = 1 in fraction terms, where ζp ≡ npn measures the fraction of products
holding live patents and ζnp ≡ nnpn the fraction of products holding dead (expired) patents.
15Henceforth, unless necessary, time variables may be suppressed for brevity.
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2.1.1 Growth rates of patented and unpatented products
Following the convention that z˙ ≡ dz/dt throughout the paper, we define g[t] ≡ n˙[t]n[t] as the in-
stantaneous growth rate of available products (or the innovation rate for brevity), gp[t] ≡ n˙p[t]np[t] as
the instantaneous grow rate of patented products, and gnp[t] ≡ n˙np[t]nnp[t] as the instantaneous growth
rate of unpatented products. Then, from n˙ = n˙p + n˙np, the innovation rate g must be a weighted
average of gp and gnp. That is,
g[t] = ζp[t]gp[t] + ζnp[t]gnp[t]. (1)
Diﬀerentiating ζp ≡ npn with respect to time t yields
ζ˙p[t] = (gp[t]− g[t])ζp[t] = (g[t]− gnp[t])ζnp[t] (2)
where ζ˙p[t] = −ζ˙np[t]. As indicated by (2), the patented-product fraction ζp increases while the
unpatented-product fraction ζnp decreases over time if gp > g or if g > gnp. Both ζp and ζnp are
predetermined stock variables at any point in time. Driven by growth rates g, gp, and gnp, these
stocks will change continuously through time. These growth rates, however, are determined by the
model’s inherent innovation mechanism and institute arrangement (i.e., patent length l), as we will
explain below.
2.1.2 Innovation and research productivity
First, the flow of varieties of goods is determined by the R&D production function,
n˙[t] = n[t]LR&D[t]
µ[t] (3)
where n[t] serves as the stock of knowledge, LR&D[t] is the quantity of labor employed for product
innovation, and µ[t], an inverse measure of research productivity, is endogenously determined by
µ[t] = θ1− φg[t] , θ > 0, φ > 0 (4)
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The positive coeﬃcient φ captures the prevalence of research congestion, or patent race, or anything
else that may decrease research productivity with ongoing expansion of innovative products.16 If φ
were set equal to zero, the research productivity measure µ[t] would be fixed at a constant parameter
θ, as in Romer (1990). But given φ > 0, the measure of µ[t] must vary with the innovation rate
g[t]. From (3), the knowledge stock accumulation (i.e. increase in n[t]) increases labor’s R&D
productivity in general, but the faster the pace of product innovation (i.e. increase in g[t]), the
greater the value of µ[t], and the smaller the research productivity of labor. Thus, while the stock
n[t] of knowledge has a positive externality for future innovation, the flow g[t] of knowledge has a
negative externality in that it lowers research productivity of labor equipped with the same stock of
knowledge. The latter can be interpreted as a wasting of resources via research congestion, patent
race, or the like. Substituting (4) into (3) yields
g[t] = LR&D[t]
θ + φLR&D[t]
(5)
It becomes clear that g is concave in the amount of R&D labor LR&D, given that φ > 0, so that
R&D productivity decreases if more R&D is undertaken. As ∂g∂LR&D |LR&D=0= 1θ < ∞, there
is an upper bound to R&D productivity and therefore a lower bound on marginal R&D costs.
As a consequence, (5) does not satisfy the Inada condition of ∂g∂LR&D |LR&D=0→ ∞. As we will
demonstrate later, this modeling feature calls for a minimal patent length below which no firm
finds it profitable to undertake any R&D.17
Given research employment LR&D[t], the flow of innovations means that n˙[t] (= n[t]g[t]) patents
are newly issued at time t, and these patents will expire at time t + l: that is, the patent patent
length l ensures n˙[t] = n˙np[t+ l], or equivalently, the flow of unpatented products is determined by
16In precise sense, equation (4) can be written as µ[t] = θ · max[ 11−φg[t] , 0] for µ ≥ 0. As such, combining (3)
and (4) yields n˙[t] = n[t]θ LR&D[t]max[
1
1−φg[t] , 0]. This production function of newer varieties has been used in Cozzi
(2003; see equation(1)). In Cozzi’s interpretation, parameter φ is to capture the cost of “monitoring innovation,”
thereby permitting Cozzi’s Romer-style model to remove the well-known scale eﬀects, in a way diﬀerent from Jones
(1995). Cozzi and Spinesi (2004) use a slightly modified innovation technology to model both horizontal and vertical
innovations, where the stock of knowledge is not represented by the stock of horizontal innovation (n[t]) as in equation
(3), but rather by a function of the stocks of horizontal and vertical innovations. Regardless, in either this paper, or
Cozzi (2003), or Cozzi and Spinesi (2004), the steady-state innovation rate is tied to the inverse of parameter φ if
population of labor is allowed to grow at a constant rate. This steady-state feature can be seen by turning equation
(3) into equation (5). I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these earlier related papers.
17This feature particularly matters for pharmaceutical or biological drugs development, which is very much costly
in terms of the lengthy clinical trials and their high risks of failures.
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n˙np[t] = n˙[t − l]. As such, the growth rates of out-of-patent and patented products can be easily
derived as18
gnp[t] =
￿
1
ζnp[t]
￿
g[t− l]e−g¯[t]l (6a)
gp[t] =
￿
1
ζp[t]
￿
(g[t]− g[t− l]e−g¯[t]l) (6b)
where g¯[t] ≡ 1l
´ t−
t−l g[s]ds represents the average of past innovation rates at s ∈ [t− l, t). Evidently,
gnp[t] is predetermined by history due to (6a), but gp[t] is not in terms of (6b) because g[t] can
change at any moment and therefore aﬀects gp[t] at the same time.
2.1.3 Innovation and the hazard-rate function
The preceding analysis depicts the dynamics of patented and out-of-patent products under a patent
system with a finite term of patent life. Under such a system, the government determines the patent
length l, which represents a patented firm’s maximum potential duration of monopoly power. Any
patented firm will expectantly lose monopoly power and be relegated to a perfectly competitive
firm, as soon as her patent expires. However, in contrast to the literature [Judd (1985), Chou and
Shy (1991), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004), Futagami and Iwaisako
(2007), Chu (2010), and Grinols and Lin (2011)], the paper allows for a non-zero hazard rate
at which any patent holder may prematurely lose monopoly power to newly patented innovators,
thereby becoming a competitive producer. We call such an innovation-induced incidence “creative
destruction of a patent’s monopoly profits.” Here the incidence of “creative destruction” shifts
profits from an old monopolist to a newly innovative monopolist, while the old one remains on the
market by being a competitive producer. Hence, the connotation of “creative destruction” is not
exactly the same as in most R&D-based endogenous growth models, where an incidence of creative
destruction not only shifts profits to new innovators, but also forces the old innovators to exit the
market [Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998)].19
18(6a) can be derived using the relationships: (i) n˙np[t] = n˙[t− l], (ii) gnp[t] ≡ n˙np[t]nnp[t] =
n˙[t−l]
n[t−l] × n[t−l]n[t] × n[t]nnp[t] , and
(iii) n[t] = n[t − l]e
´ t−
t−l g[s]ds, where the upper bound t− means that the time is very close to, but not equal to, t.
Hence, gnp[t] is predetermined by history. (6b) obtains using (1) and (6a).
19Empirically, in fact, creative destruction does not always mean to destroy old firms. For instance, patented and
generic drugs are provided under monopoly and competitive pricing, respectively. Producers of these drugs coexist.
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Thus, prior to a patent’s legal maturity, any patented firm faces the hazard of creative de-
struction at any point in time. Of the np patent holders, therefore, nMp firms are identified
as monopolists and the remaining nNMp firms are referred to as non-monopolists, who still hold
live patents but have lost monopoly power under creative destruction. That is, we have the
identity nMp + nNMp = np = n − nnp at any moment. In fractional terms, this identity is
ζMp + ζNMp = ζp = 1 − ζnp, where ζMp ≡ n
M
p
n and ζNMp ≡
nNMp
n . The creative-destruction haz-
ard prevails at all times, forcing patented firms to shift from the nMp -group to the nNMp -group over
time. This dynamic shift will be formulated later in this subsection.
Hazard rate function in General Let h[t] be the instantaneous hazard-rate at time t and
let T be a random variable denoting the time of a patent’s “death” — meaning a patent fails to
maintain monopoly power for the patent holder. Then within a patent’s legal life, h[t]dt measures
the instantaneous probability that a patented monopolist may unfortunately lose monopoly power
in an instant (dt) to newer innovations. In general terms, h[t]dt is a conditional probability defined
as20
h[t]dt ≡ Pr[t < T ≤ t+ dt | T > t] = Pr[t < T ≤ t+ dt]Pr[T > t] , t ∈ [τ, τ + l) (7)
where τ denotes the time of a patent issued and t ∈ [τ, τ + l) means that a patent’s legal life
is fixed at l > 0. In the terminologies of survival analysis, we can define F [t] ≡ Pr[T ≤ t] as
the lifetime distribution function, f [t] = F ￿[t] as the lifetime probability density function, and
S[t] ≡ Pr[T > t] = 1 − F [t] as the survival function. As defined, the survival function measures
the probability that a patented firm has survived the ongoing creative-destruction hazards. If the
hazard rate h[t] is known at any moment, one can easily derive the survival function as21
S[t] ≡ Pr[T > t] = e−Λ[t], τ ≤ t < τ + l (8)
where Λ[t] =
´ t
τ h[ω]dω is called the cumulative hazard function for a newly issued patent. This
equation implies S[t] = 1 at t = τ , connoting that there is no immediate death as the patent is
Apple laptops are pricey at about US$1,000 or more, but other brands could be as low as $US500 from anecdotal
market data. Apple Inc. has not destroyed all other brands.
20Note that Pr[.] is a probability function and Pr[t < T ≤ +dt ∩ T > t] = Pr[t < T ≤ t+ dt].
21From (7) and the definitions of F [t], f [t] and S[t], it holds that h[t]dt = f [t]dtS[t] =
−S￿[t]
S[t] dt = − d logS[t]dt dt. Thus,
h[t] = − d logS[t]dt and it can solve for (7).
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issued. But the patent system is assumed to have a finite patent length, so a terminal boundary
condition must be invoked to force S[t] to jump down to zero at t = τ + l. This condition forces
any surviving patented firm to exit the monopoly group as soon as the patent expires. The hazard
rate h[t] and the survival function S[t] play an important role in the model. Later, we will use
them to determine the market value of patents of diﬀerent vintages, and the dynamic changes in
patented monopolists and non-monopolists. For now, we need to discuss the market mechanism
that determines the time-variant hazard rate h[t] for the modeled economy.
Determining hazard rate In economics literature on innovation and economic growth, economists
often deal with multiple sources of hazards that arise from innovating, imitating, or other activi-
ties, and they adopt diﬀerent ways to determine the hazard rate h[t] confronting incumbent firms.
The simplest way assumes a constant hazard rate of h[t] = h0 at any time, as in Helpman (1993),
Grinols and Lin (1997, 2006), Lin (2002), Furukawa (2007) and others, where the rate of imitation
of innovative goods is set exogenously to reflect the degree of intellectual property rights protec-
tion and serves as a constant hazard rate. This is equivalent to presuming an exponential lifetime
distribution function for the modeled economy so that F [t] = 1 − e−h0(t−τ).22 Some other works,
however, endogenize the hazard rate either as an externality of economy-wide innovating activities
[e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1992, ch.4), Jones and Williams (2000), O’Donoghue and Zweimüller
(2004), and Iwaisako, et al. (2011)] or as a purposive result of profit-driven activities, respectively,
in imitation [e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1992, ch. 11), outbound FDI (foreign direct invest-
ment) [e.g., Lin (2010)], and rent seeking-cum-innovation [e.g., Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007),
Grieben and Sener (2009), and Davis and Sener (2012)].23
Following Jones and Williams (2000), we endogenize the instantaneous hazard rate as an exter-
nality of economy-wide innovating activities:
h[t] = ψ · n˙[t]
n[t] ≡ ψ · g[t], ψ > 0 (9)
22With this assumed exponential lifetime distribution function, it holds that f [t] = F ￿[t] = h0e−h0(t−τ) and
S[t] = e−h0(t−τ). It must be true that h[t] = f [t]S[t] = h0 according to (7). It is well-known that the assumed
exponential distribution function F [t] = 1−e−h0(t−τ) is associated with a Poisson distribution with probability mass:
P[x] = e−h0(t−τ)(t−τ)xx! , where x is the number of event occurrences in a time duration of t − τ (in most discussion
elsewhere, τ = 0 and t represents a time duration). In the context of the present paper, the event refers to creative
destruction. It can be verified that P[x = 0] = e−h0(t−τ) = S[t].
23These cited works all assume an infinite patent length for their quality-ladder growth models.
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where n˙ = dndt as defined earlier. From equation (9), the hazard rate h[t] is positively associated
with the innovation rate g[t] determined by the market equilibrium level of aggregate R&D input
LR&D (see (5)). This hazard-rate function becomes lucid if we verify that h[t]dt is actually equal to
ψdn
n =
ζMp ·ψdn
nMp
, a clear measure of the instantaneous probability that a firm among the nMp patented
monopolists is forced to prematurely lose monopoly power.24
How important is an endogenous hazard rate? First of all, with a non-zero hazard zero, either
exogenous or endogenous, eﬀective patent life (i.e. a patented firm’s expected monopoly duration)
must be shorter than its legal life. More importantly, if the hazard rate is endogenized, a patent’s
eﬀective life must respond to changes in statutory patent length. In this sense, the present paper
actually deals with endogenous intellectual proper rights (IPR) protection by adjusting statutory
patent length to influence the innovation-determined hazard rate, which then determines eﬀective
patent life. Therefore, this paper is an important supplement to the endogenous IPR literature
that focuses on rent-seeking activities; see, for instance, Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007), Eicher
and García-Peñalosa (2008), Grieben and Sener (2009), Davis and Sener (2012).
2.1.4 Motions of the fractions of patented monopolists and non-monopolists
We now show how the hazard rate h[t] interact with the innovation rate g[t] so as to drive the
shifting dynamics between the nMp monopolists and nNMp non-monopolists. First of all, given the
hazard rate h[t], there are h[t] · nMp monopolists forced into the non-monopolist group, where ever
firm still holds a legally live patent. As such, it must hold that n˙NMp [t] = h[t] ·nMp [t] at any moment.
Using this result and diﬀerentiating ζMp ≡ n
M
p
n and ζNMp ≡
nNMp
n with respect to time t, we can
24From equation (9) and ζMp =
nMp
n , it holds that h[t]dt =
ψdn
n =
(nMp /n)·ψdn
nMp
= ζ
M
p ·ψdn
nMp
. This results implies
that as soon as dn new goods are invented in an instant (dt), there are ψdn existing goods confronting these newly
invented goods. Further, assume that the market confrontation spread out proportionally over a stream of all n
(= nnp + nNMp + nMp ) existing goods that satisfy the identity ζp + ζnp = ζMp + ζNMp + ζnp = 1. Then only ζMp · ψdn
existing goods, which are monopoly-provided, are forced to lose monopoly power (we call it creative destruction),
while all other (ζnp + ζNMp )·ψdn goods, which are already competitively provided, merely face more competition in
a more crowded diﬀerentiated goods market. In contrast to the present paper, Jones and Williams (2000) assume
that patents are infinitely lived and that creative destruction is an incidence of forcing incumbent firms to exit the
market. Thus, in Jones and Williams (2000), there is no need to distinguish between patented and unpatented firms
or between monopolists and non-monopolists.
12
obtain the motions of ζNMp and ζMp :25
ζ˙NMp [t] = ζMp [t]h[t]− ζNMp [t]g[t] (10a)
ζ˙Mp [t] = gp[t]ζp[t]− ζMp [t](h[t] + g[t])
= (g[t]− g[t− l]e−g¯[t]l)− ζMp [t](h[t] + g[t]) (10b)
As expected, starting from the model’s long-run steady state (i.e. ζ˙NMp = ζ˙Mp = 0), an increase in
the hazard rate h[t] must drive the non-monopolist fraction ζNMp to increase and the monopolist
fraction ζMp to decrease, ceteris paribus. In what follows we turn to the patent value, which
determines the value of a patented firm that has not yet been creatively destructed.
2.2 Patent value
In the modeled economy, patents are issued sequentially over time when new varieties are developed.
They are tradeable and distinguished by patent vintages (i.e. dates of patent issuance). Define
v[t, τ ], t ≥ τ , as the value of a patent previously issued at time τ but currently live at time
t ∈ [τ, τ + l). Then the patent value v[t, τ ] determines the value of a firm holding a vintage-τ
patent. At any point in time, the firm may survive to earn the profit flow π[t, τ ] > 0 , but this
instantaneous probability is determined by the survival function S[.] according to (8). The value of
a firm holding a vintage−τ patent at time t is therefore determined by the discounted present value
of the profit flow it expects to earn during its patent’s remaining life (= τ + l − t) to maturity,26
v[t, τ ] =
ˆ τ+l
t
e−
´ s
t r[ω]dωπ[s] · S[s]ds, t ∈ [τ, τ + l)
=
ˆ τ+l
t
e−
´ s
t (r[ω]+h[ω])dωπ[s]ds (11)
25Note that ζMp + ζNMp = ζp and thus ζ˙Mp + ζ˙NMp = ζ˙p. Using ζ˙NMp [t] =
￿
n˙NMp [t]
nNMp [t]
− g[t]
￿
ζNMp [t] =￿
nMp [t]
nNMp [t]
n˙NMp [t]
nMp [t]
− g[t]
￿
ζNMp [t], we obtain (10a) if the equality relationships
nMp
nNMp
= ζ
M
p
ζNMp
& n˙
NM
p [t]
nMp [t]
=
h[t] are used. In similar ways, using ζ˙Mp [t] =
￿
n˙Mp [t]
nMp [t]
− g[t]
￿
ζMp [t] =
￿
n˙p[t]−n˙NMp [t]
nMp [t]
− g[t]
￿
ζMp [t] =￿
(n˙p[t]/np[t])(np[t]/n[t])
nMp [t]/n[t]
− h[t]− g[t]
￿
ζMp [t], we obtain (10b).
26Note that the survival function is given by S[s] = e−Λ[s], where Λ[s] =
´ s
t
h[ω]dω computes cumulative hazards
from t to s. In equation (8), Λ[t] is to compute cumulative hazards from τ to t.
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where r is the interest rate, h is the hazard rate, r + h is the risk-adjusted cost of capital, and
π[s] > 0 if t ∈ [τ, τ + l). From (11), we can derive the Bellman-type equation,27
v˙[t, τ ] ≡ dv[t, τ ]
dt
= r[t]v[t, τ ]− π[t] + v[t, τ ] · h[t], t ∈ [τ, τ + l) (12)
subject to two boundary conditions
v[t, τ ] = θw[t](1− φg[t])n[t] at t = τ (13a)
v[t, τ ] = 0 at t ≥ τ + l (13b)
(12) is a first-order ordinary diﬀerential equation depicting the motion of the value of a live patent
and can be easily translated into the well-known no-arbitrage condition — r[t] = v˙[t,τ ]v[t,τ ] +
π[t]
v[t,τ ] −h[t]
— implying that under well functioning financial markets, the riskless rate of interest r must match
the risk-adjusted rate of return (= capital-gain rate v˙v plus profit rate πv minus hazard rate h). The
two boundary conditions, however, constrain the value of any live patent into a closed interval
[0, θw[t](1−φg[t])n[t] ], where term
θw[t]
(1−φg[t])n[t] is the development cost of a new product according to (3) or
(5) and represents the upper bound of patent values of all vintages. If v[t, t] were allowed to exceed
the upper bound, there would be unbounded R&D demand for labor. It is evident from (11) that
0 ≤ v[t, τ ￿] < v[t, τ ￿￿] ≤ v[t, t] = θw[t](1−φg[t])n[t] for τ ￿ < τ ￿￿ ≤ t. That is, consistent with our intuition, a
patent with a longer life expectancy is more valuable, given that every monopolist earns the same
profit flow at a point in time.
2.3 Households
The household sector provides equity funds to establish firms. We assume a representative house-
hold who consumes a stream of goods {xi}ni=0 resulting from previous R&D activities. Hence, total
27Using finite diﬀerences, the value of a patent can be approximated by,
v[t, τ ] = π[t, τ ]￿t · (1− h[t]￿t) + ( 11 + r￿t )v[t+￿t, τ ] · (1− h[t]￿t)
where h[t]￿t is the probability of being “creatively destructed” during an instant. Rearranging terms yields
dv[t, τ ]
dt
≈ v[t+￿t, τ ]− v[t, τ ]￿t = rv[t, τ ]− π[t, τ ] · (1− h[t]￿t) + v[t+￿t, τ ] · h[t]
Thus, (12) obtains by letting ￿t going to zero asymptotically.
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nominal consumption expenditure is equal to E =
´ n
0 p[i]x[i]di. The household is endowed with
a fixed level of labor L and earns the full-employment level of wage income wL, where w is the
wage rate. At any point in time, labor Lx is employed to produce goods xi for i ∈ [0, n] and the
remaining labor LR&D is engaged in R&D to invent n˙ new goods, which result in n˙ new patents
(or new firms). Therefore, L = Lx + LR&D is the full employment condition.
The household owns equity shares, which represent claims to all firms. Her total wealth at
a time, denoted by A, is the sum of stock market values of all live patents that have not yet
been “creatively destructed” by newer product innovations. That is, A[t] =
´ τ+l
τ n
M
p [t, s]v[t, s]ds,
where nMp [t, τ ] is the number of valuable vintage-τ patents and satisfies
´ τ+l
τ n
M
p [t, s]ds = nMp [t],
the number of monopoly firms. The household earns investment income flows, which are dividends
resulting from monopoly profits plus capital gains due to appreciation of share values net of the
losses of creative destruction. As such, the net investment income flow must be equal to r[t]A[t]
under no-arbitrage conditions.28 The household’s decision problem is to choose C[t] to maximize
lifetime utility,
U [t] =
∞ˆ
t
e−ρs log[ C[s]
nβ/(ε−1)
]ds, (14)
subject to the dynamic budget constraint,
A˙[t] = r[t]A[t] + w[t]L[t]− E[t]. (15)
In the utility function parameter ρ reflects the household’s time preference, aggregate consumption
is presumably measured by the CES consumption index C =
￿´ n
0 x[i]
ε−1
ε di
￿ ε
ε−1 , parameter ε > 1
is the elasticity of substitution between goods, and term nβ/(ε−1) provides flexibility for the utility
function to capture the welfare eﬀects of increased variety of substitutable goods. As will be
explained later, parameter β ∈ [0, 1] in (14) is used to reflect the aggregate welfare importance of
(horizontal) product diﬀerentiation.
As (15) indicates, if the aggregate income inflow (net investment income rA plus wage income
28Using the above-mentioned no-arbitrage condition r[t] = v˙[t,τ ]v[t,τ ] +
π[t]
v[t,τ ] − h[t], the household’s net investment
income flow is given by A[t]× ( v˙[t,τ ]v[t,τ ] + π[t]v[t,τ ] − h[t]) and must be tied to r[t]A[t].
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wL) exceeds the aggregate consumption expenditure flow E, the household’s wealth increases (i.e.
A˙ > 0); otherwise, the reverse is true. Let P be the aggregate price level such that E = P × C.
Then, maximization of lifetime utility (14) yields the well-known Euler condition,
C˙[t]
C[t] +
P˙ [t]
P [t] =
E˙[t]
E[t] = r[t]− ρ, (16)
to govern the instantaneous growth rate E˙E of nominal consumption expenditure.
For a given level of consumption expenditure E at a point in time, maximization of the instan-
taneous utility flow measured by log[ C[s]
nβ/(ε−1) ] yields the goods demand functions,
x[i] =
￿
p[i]
P
￿−ε ￿E
P
￿
, i ∈ [0, n], (17)
where the aggregate price level is given by P =
￿´ n
0 p[i]1−εdi
￿1/(1−ε) and it can be verified that
E = P × C.
2.4 Firms
Assume that a unit of good x[i], i ∈ [0, n], is produced with a unit of labor. Then the marginal
cost of any available good is equal to labor wage w. As described above, firms with dead patents
are perfectly competitive, so are the firms that hold legally valid patents but had been forced by
creative destruction to give away monopoly power to newer innovative firms. The two groups of
firms therefore price outputs at marginal cost. The third group of firms hold legally live patents and
are still able to command their patent-granted monopoly power, so they price outputs at a markup
over marginal cost. Assume that each group of firms are symmetric. Their pricing conditions are
given below:
p[i] =

pnp = w if i ∈ [0, nnp]
pNMp = w if i ∈ NM ⊂ (nnp, n]
pMp = αw if i ∈M ⊂ (nnp, n]
(18)
where pnp is the representative price of goods from firms with dead patents, pNMp is the represen-
tative price of goods from firms with legally live patents but with no monopoly power, and pMp is
the representative price of goods from firms with both legally live patents and monopoly power.
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Both pnp and pNMp are equal to marginal cost w, which is below the monopoly price pMp , subject to
the markup rate α = εε−1 > 1. These representative prices and demand functions (17) imply the
following representative outputs in goods market equilibrium:
x[i] =

xnp =
￿pnp
P
￿−ε ￿E
P
￿
, if i ∈ [0, nnp],
xNMp =
￿
pNMp
P
￿−ε ￿
E
P
￿
, if i ∈ NM ⊂ (nnp, n],
xMp =
￿
pMp
P
￿−ε ￿
E
P
￿
, if i ∈M ⊂ (nnp, n].
(19)
Clearly, xnp = xNMp = αεxMp and using these representative outputs, price level P can simplify to
P = (nnpp1−εnp + nNMp (pNMp )1−ε + nMp (pMp )1−ε)
1
1−ε = w · n− 1ε−1 · ϕ, (20a)
where
ϕ = ϕ
￿
ζMp ,α
￿
=
￿
1− ζMp + ζMp α1−ε
￿1/(1−ε) ≥ 1 (20b)
As indicated, ϕ ≥ 1 is a measure of monopoly distortion, raising the aggregate price level P . This
distortion is significant if ϕ deviates further from one, and it vanishes if ϕ falls to one. From (18)
and (19), every monopolist earns a positive profit flow equal to π[t, τ ] = π[t] = (α − 1)wxMp at
a time if t ∈ [τ, τ + l), regardless of the vintage of the patent. However, the profit flow π[t] per
firm will diminish over time as future product innovation will decrease the market size xMp of every
incumbent monopolist. This will become clear later in subsection 2.5.
Now, substituting (19) into (14) permits us to write the log flow of utility as
log[ C
nβ/(ε−1)
] = log
￿
n
1
ε−1 (1−β)
￿
+ log
￿￿
(ζnp)
1
ε (Xnp)
ε−1
ε + (ζNMp )
1
ε (XNMp )
ε−1
ε + (ζMp )
1
ε (XMp )
ε−1
ε
￿ ε
ε−1
￿
(21)
where Xnp = nnpxnp, XNMp = nNMp xNMp and XMp = nMp xMp are aggregate consumption of goods
from each group of firms, respectively. From (21), we can see how parameter β aﬀects the log-flow
of utility. If β is between 0 and 1, an increase in n contributes to the utility flow, but at a decreasing
rate due to the logarithmic term. If β = 1, an increase in n has no eﬀect on utility, ceteris paribus.
Hence, parameter β reflects the aggregate welfare importance of product diﬀerentiation. We assume
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β ∈ [0, 1] in the model, in recognition that greater prevalence of similar goods exerts diminishing
welfare eﬀects and that diﬀerentiated goods are often not equally important to regional demanders
in the world.29
2.5 Full employment and economy-wide markup
We now proceed to inspect how product innovation can dilute the profit flow over time. As noted
earlier, R&D employment of labor is equal to LR&D = θg1−φg in terms of (3), so L− LR&D is labor
employed to manufacture goods. The full employment condition can therefore be rewritten as
L− θg1− φg = n · (ζ
M
p x
M
p + ζNMp xNMp + ζnpxnp). (22)
Using xnp = xNMp = αεxMp and ζMp + ζNMp + ζnp = 1, the levels of outputs at full employment can
be derived as follows:
xnp = xNMp =
1
n
￿
αε
ζMp + (1− ζMp )αε
￿￿
L− θg1− φg
￿
, (23a)
xMp =
1
n
￿
1
ζMp + (1− ζMp )αε
￿￿
L− θg1− φg
￿
. (23b)
It is now clear from (23a) and (23b) that given a constant innovation rate g, the growth of product
variety (greater n) must decrease the market size for all incumbent firms. Thus, as mentioned in
(11), the profit flow π[t] accrued to every monopolist must be diluted over time by future product
innovation. Using (23a) and (23b), we can further pin down aggregate consumption expenditure
E = n(1− ζMp )xnp · w + nζMp xMp · αw as shown below,
E = ξw
￿
L− θg1− φg
￿
, (24)
where
ξ = ξ[ζMp ] =
ζMp α+ (1− ζMp )αε
ζMp + (1− ζMp )αε
< α. (25)
Variable ξ bears interesting economic implications. From (24), ξ is the ratio of consumption ex-
penditure E to aggregate production cost w(L− θg1−φg ) of all available goods. Thus, we can inter-
29See Footnote 8 for more detailed discussions.
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pret ξ as an economy-wide markup rate, which is endogenous and varies with the fraction ζMp of
monopoly goods, given the exogenous product-specific markup rate α. It can be shown that (i)
the economy-wide markup rate is positively associated with the fraction of monopoly goods due to
∂ξ
∂ζMp
= (α−1)α
ε
[ζMp +(1−ζMp )αε]2 > 0 for ζ
M
p ∈ (0, 1); (ii) ξ = α at ζMp = 1 implying that all available goods
are priced at a markup over marginal cost; (iii) ξ = 1 at ζMp = 0 implying that all goods are priced
at marginal cost.
2.6 Balanced growth path
We chose E to be a numeraire; i.e., E = 1. Then given a set of state variables n, np, nnp, nNMp ,
nMp , ζp, ζnp, ζNMp , ζMp , which are predetermined at any point in time, we can solve the model’s nine
instantaneous equilibrium conditions (18), (19), (20a) , (22), (24) for the nine variables pMp , pNMp ,
pnp, w, xMp , xNMp , xnp P , and g.30 As the time marches forward, however, the predetermined state
variables of n￿s will keep growing, provided the economy has ongoing product innovation, and the
other predetermined state variables of ζ ￿s will change in transition toward their respective long-run
steady-state equilibrium levels. As the paper is focused on the question of what patent length (l)
maximizes a global economy’s long-run welfare, we confine the analysis to the model’s balanced
growth path in what follows.
Hence, we need a set of long-run steady state equilibrium conditions to close the model. First,
choosing nominal expenditure E as the numeraire ensures that E˙[t] = 0 and thus r[t] = r = ρ
at all times according the Euler condition (16). Second, a balanced growth path requires that
the innovation rate g[t] must stay constant over time so that g[t − l] = g[t] = g at any moment.
Third, along the balanced growth path, the fractions of ζ ￿s must stay constant as well; that is,
ζ˙np[t] = ζ˙p[t] = ζ˙NMp [t] = ζ˙Mp [t] = 0 at all times. Fourth, we applied the patent value’s upper
bound (13a) to the no-arbitrage condition (11) in order to ensure an ongoing innovation process in
steady state. In so doing, we derived below a two-equation, steady-state equilibrium system that
30Once g is solved, h is determined in terms of (9), and gp is determined in terms of (6b), given that gnp is
predetermined by (6a).
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can be solved for the values of g and ζMp along a balanced growth path:31
µ = (α− 1) ·
￿
1
ζMp + (1− ζMp )αε
￿
(L− µg)
￿
1− e−(ρ+h+g)l
ρ+ h+ g
￿
(26a)
ζMp =
1− e−gl
1 + ψ (26b)
where µ = θ1−φg is an inverse measure of research productivity from equation (4) and h = ψg is
the instantaneous hazard rate according to equation (9). Remarks on each of the two steady state
equilibrium conditions are in order. For condition (26a), the very left term of µ reflects the real
cost (measured in labor units) of developing a new product, while the right-hand side measures
the discounted present value (measured in labor units) of future profit flows accruing to a newly
established monopoly firm.32 On the right-hand side are four interesting terms: (i) term α − 1 is
the profit flow per output unit; (ii) term 1ζMp +(1−ζMp )αε is the market share per monopolist; (iii) term
L− µg is the combined output level of available goods;33 and (iv) term 1−e−(ρ+h+g)lρ+h+g is the eﬀective
discount factor, implying that the “eﬀective cost of capital” actually equals ρ+ h+ g (= r+ h+ g)
along the balanced growth path. The innovation rate g enters the eﬀective discount factor to capture
innovation-induced profit dilution. Another important aspect is that if patent length l were set
equal zero, the eﬀective discount factor would become zero, thereby making a viable innovating
process impossible. But as we will show later, the minimum patent length to sustain a viable
innovating process is actually way above zero. The next steady-state condition (26b) determines
the loci of (ζMp , g) that ensures ζ˙Mp = 0, given a constant innovation rate g. This condition implies
that a greater constant innovation rate must be associated with a greater constant fraction ζMp of
monopoly firms in steady state.
If we let g approach zero in conditions (26a) and (26b), the minimum patent length l required
31Derivations of (26a) are shown in Appendix A, while (26b) can be easily derived by setting setting ζ˙Mp = 0 in
(10b) where g[t] = 1l
´ t−
t−l g[s]ds = g in steady state. Notice that all other state variables can be expressed in terms of
g and ζMp . For instance, noting g[t] = g[t− l] = g in steady state, we have ζnp = e−gl from (6a), ζp = 1− e−gl from
(6b), and ζNMp = ζp − ζMp
32It should be noticed that the measure of product variety, n, drops out of condition (26a). As analyzed earlier,
given a constant innovation rate g, the growth of product variety n must dilute per firm profit flow over time. But on
the other hand, the growth of product variety (or stock of knowledge) also keeps decreasing the development cost due
to the positive externality of knowledge stock. The two opposing forces precisely counter each other so that product
variety n does not appear in (26a). See Appendix A for details.
33The product of µ and g measures the level of labor employment in R&D activities. So, the remaining labor
L− µg is employed to manufacture goods.
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to sustain a viable innovation process in steady state is given by
l =
− log
￿
1−
￿
αε
α−1
￿ ￿
θ
L
￿
ρ
￿
ρ
(27)
As l approaches l from above, both g and ζMp go to 0+. As noted earlier, the R&D production
function (5) implies that an active R&D sector requires a minimum patent length. Thus far we
have developed a model ready for computational analysis.
3 Model Calibration and Simulations
3.1 Baseline parameter values
To calibrate the model to a closed economy, which we take as a global economy, we chose a set
of baseline parameter values in Table 1.34 The coeﬃcient ρ of time preference was set equal to
0.04, which ensures the real interest rate r equal to 4 percent per annum, since E serves as a
numeraire. The elasticity ε of demand for an individual product was set equal to 1.23, which
ensures an individual monopoly product’s markup rate of α = ε/(ε−1) = 5.3. Assuming a globally
harmonious patent system, patent length l was chosen as 20 years to match the level of advanced
economies in the world. L = 1 implies that global population was normalized to unity. Finally, we
are free to choose the other three parameter values (θ, φ, ψ) on account of no reliable empirical
estimates. We therefore chose θ = 5 (inverse of research productivity), φ = 1 (research congestion
or patent race) and ψ = 1 (creative destruction), so as to make the model able to deliver the
innovation rate (g), economy-wide markup rate (ξ), cost of capital (ρ + h) and eﬀective cost of
capital (ρ+ h+ g) that largely mimic the world’s empirical statistics.
Parameter ρ ε l L θ φ ψ
Value 0.04 1.23 20 1 5 1 1
Table 1: Baseline parameter values
34The chosen parameter ρ (time preference) is in annual rates so that the time unit in the simulations represents
one year. As such, l = 10 means a 10-year patent length.
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3.2 Computing the balanced-growth path equilibrium
Using the baseline parameter values listed in Table 1 and for illustrative purposes, we computed the
steady-state equilibrium by solving equations (26a) and (26b), respectively, for the patent length of
l = 20 years and l→∞. The results are shown in Figure 1, where point a represents the benchmark
steady state equilibrium with the fraction of monopoly firms ζMp = 21.67% and the innovation rate
g = 2.84%. Using the computed innovation rate and (9), the creative-destruction hazard rate is
equal to h = 0.0284, which implies the cost of capital equal to ρ + h = 0.0684 and the eﬀective
cost of capital equal to ρ + h + g = 0.0968. The computed monopoly fraction ζMp = 21.67% and
the chosen demand elasticity ε = 1.23 combine to yield the economy-wide markup rate of ξ = 1.15
according to (25). The economy-wide markup rate falls onto the range of estimates 1.05 to 1.40 by
Norrbin (1993) and Basu (1996). The innovation rate of 2.84% also largely matches the average
annual growth rate of the world’s OECD-published triadic patent families between 1985 and 2008.
As indicated in Figure 1, if patent length l is infinitely large, the locis of (ζMp , g) at which
ζ˙Mp = 0 shift rightwards from the solid curve to the dashed one, while the locis at which g˙ = 0
shifts upwards from the solid curve to the dashed one. As a result, the steady state equilibrium
shifts from point a to point b, which indicates a faster innovation rate (g = 4.92%) and a larger
monopoly fraction (ζMp = 50%). These results yield a greater hazard rate (h = 0.0492), a greater
cost of capital (ρ + h = 0.0892), a greater eﬀective cost of capital (ρ + h + g = 0.1384), and a
greater economy-wide markup rate of ξ = 1.49. These numerical results reflect the present model’s
novel features. First of all, as l is lengthened to unlimited years, larger future profit flows redirect
more resources (labor) into R&D activities, thereby generating a faster innovation rate (from 2.84%
to 4.92%). But the faster innovation rate must give rise to a larger idiosyncratic risk of creative
destruction on incumbent monopolists, thereby raising the hazard rate and the cost of capital.
Also, faster innovation must raise the weight of monopoly and thus the economy-wide markup rate.
Further, as formulated in (4), due to the prevalence of patent races, a faster innovation rate can
lead to lower research productivity at a given stock of knowledge (denoted by n). Without the
hazard of creative destruction and/or the prevalence of patent races, however, the innovating pace
resulting from increased patent life would otherwise be even stronger, as we will report in what
follows.
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Figure 1: Steady State Equilibrium at l = 20 or l → ∞, using baseline parameter values for eqs.
(26a) & (26b).
3.3 Robustness checks on patent length and pace of innovation
From the above simulations, extending the benchmark patent length (20 years) into infinity was
seen to enhance the innovation rate, the fraction of monopoly goods, and the hazard rate of creative
destruction. But we are yet to see whether these relationships still hold when only smaller changes
in patent length l are in place. In this subsection we simulate the eﬀects of extending the patent
length. Scenario A of Table 2 represents the benchmark scenario using the baseline parameter
values. The implications of Scenario A is summarized in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: For a closed economy, extending the duration of patents tends to
increase the innovation rate, the share of monopoly goods, the economy-wide markup,
and the hazard rate facing incumbent monopoly firms along the balanced growth path,
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Patent
Term
l
12
15
20
25
30
50
100
∞
Scenario A
ψ = 1, φ = 1
g,% ζMP ,% h
0.44 2.58 .0044
1.68 11.15 .0168
2.84 21.67 .0284
3.48 29.06 .0348
3.88 34.40 .0388
4.59 44.95 .0459
4.89 49.62 .0489
4.92 50.00 .0492
Scenario B:
ψ → 1.05
g,% ζMP ,% h
0.43 2.44 .0045
1.63 10.55 .0171
2.74 20.58 .0288
3.36 27.70 .0352
3.74 32.90 .0393
4.42 43.43 .0464
4.73 48.35 .0497
4.76 48.78 .050
Scenario C:
φ→ 1.05
g,% ζMP ,% h
0.44 2.57 .0044
1.67 11.11 .0167
2.83 21.60 .0283
3.47 28.99 .0348
3.87 34.33 .0387
4.57 44.91 .0457
4.88 49.62 .0488
4.90 50.00 .0490
Table 2: Scenario A is benchmark with ψ = φ = 1. Product innovation, monopoly firms, and
hazard rate, as ψ (coeﬃcient of creative destruction) or φ (coeﬃcient of research congestion or
patent races) is increased.
but these eﬀects tend to diminish with the patent length.35
These diminishing marginal eﬀects of extending the patent term appear robust to changes in the
value of parameters ψ and φ, which, as noted earlier, respectively, capture the eﬀects of creative
destruction and research congestion/patent race. The robustness checks are presented, respectively,
in Scenario B of Table 2. From these robustness checks, we obtain:
Proposition 2: For a closed economy where product innovation creates the hazard of
creative destruction and the wasting of resources via research congestion/patent races,
the innovation rate corresponding to each patent term tends to be smaller along the
balanced growth path, if either the eﬀect of creative destruction or the prevalence of
research congestion or patent race becomes more significant. 36
4 Welfare
We now turn to welfare analysis and demonstrate how to numerically solve for the socially optimal
patent length.
35The diminishing eﬀects of extending the patent term appear clearly from Scenario A of Table 2. For instance,
as patent term l is increased from 15 to 20 years (an increase of 5 years), the innovation rate g is up 1.16 percentage
points (= 2.84% − 1.68%), but as l is increased from 20 to 25 years (an increase of 10 years), the innovation rate is
only up 0.64 percentage point (= 3.48%− 2.84%).
36For instance, at l = 20, the innovation rate is g = 2.74% from scenario B (larger ψ) and g = 2.83% from scenario
C (larger φ), compared to g = 2.84% from benchmark scenario A.
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4.1 Channels of welfare change
For welfare analysis, we decomposed lifetime utility (14) into a predetermined constant term logn[0](ε−1)ρ ,
which can be suppressed by setting n[0] = 1, plus four endogenous components attributed to product
innovation (Un), saving rate (U s), monopoly-induced price distortion (UM/price), and monopoly-
induced cost reduction (UM/cost) as given below:37
U = Un + U s + UM/Price + UM/Cost (28)
where
Un = (1− β)g(ε− 1)ρ2 ≥ 0, (29a)
U s = 1
ρ
log (L− µg) ≤ 0, (29b)
UM/price = −1
ρ
logϕ = 1(ε− 1)ρ log
￿
1− ζMp + ζMp α1−ε
￿
≤ 0, (29c)
UM/cost = 1
ρ
log ξ = 1
ρ
log
ζMp α+ (1− ζMp )αε
ζMp + (1− ζMp )αε
≥ 0. (29d)
Explanation of these four welfare components are in order. First, with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, ε > 1 and ρ > 0,
the innovation-generated welfare component, Un, is nonnegative in terms of (29a), provided R&D
is sustainable. This component contributes more to lifetime utility if product innovation proceeds
at a faster rate. Second, a faster innovation rate (increase in g) must result in a higher degree of
R&D intensity measured by µg (= θg1−φg ; see (5)) call for a higher saving rate, and thus decrease
lifetime utility.38 That is, faster innovation requires more R&D investment, which calls for more
saving from households. Therefore, to sustain a faster pace of product innovation, households must
have a higher saving rate to finance a higher research-intensive economy, and thus sacrifice welfare
to some extent. This welfare channel is captured by the second (nonpositive) component U s ≤ 0
according to (29b). Third, from (26b), a faster innovation rate must raise the monopoly fraction
ζMp , thereby deteriorating the monopoly-induced price distortion by raising the aggregate price
level P through an increase in ϕ ≥ 1 and thereby decreasing household welfare, as indicated by the
37See Appendix B for the derivations of lifetime utility components.
38Note that since µg measures the level of R&D labor employment, L = 1 implies ( θg1−φg )/L =
θg
1−φg , a share of
resources (labor) allocated to R&D. So, µg is also a measure of the modeled economy’s R&D intensity.
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Figure 2: Optimal patent length: balancing gains from innovation against welfare losses from both
increased R&D intensity (saving) and increased net monopoly distortion; distances a and b are
equal approximately, meaning dUn ≈ |dU s + dUM | with dUM = dUM/price + dUM/cost (given
dl ≈ ￿l = 1), where dU(l = i) ≈ U(l = i)− U(l = i− 1).
third (nonpositive) component UM/price ≤ 0.39 Lastly, notice that while the monopoly distortion
raises P , the same distortion also decreases demand for labor in production of goods. This eﬀect
tends to lower labor wage and thus marginal production cost, thereby to some extent mitigating the
monopoly-induced price distortion. Hence, the monopoly-induced cost reduction has a nonnegative
contribution to household welfare, as indicated by the fourth (nonnegative) component UM/cost ≥
0. Thus, in the present general-equilibrium setting, the net monopoly distortion is measured by
UM ≡ UM/price + UM/cost.
39From (20b), ϕ ≥ 1 and therefore UMonopoly/Price must be nonpositive.
26
4.2 Simulations for optimal patent life
From our earlier simulations in subsection 3.2, a longer duration of the patent life leads to a
faster pace of product innovation along the balanced-growth path. But from (28) and (29a) -
(29d), extending the patent life l exerts opposing steady-state eﬀects on household’s lifetime welfare
through multiple channels. Hence, if there exists a finite patent length l∗ ∈ (l,∞) ⊂ [0,∞)
that maximizes the household’s lifetime steady-state welfare, such an optimal patent life must be
determined at the margin where40
dU
dl
= dU
n
dl
+ dU
s
dl
+ dU
M
dl
= 0.
That is, the optimal patent length l∗ must ensure that the welfare increment attributed to faster
product innovation be balanced against the welfare reduction attributed to both increased research
intensity and increased net monopoly distortion. For illustrative purposes, we discretized the l-
domain [0,∞) into a set of equally distanced grid points so that dl ≈ ￿l = 1 (i.e., an one-year
increment in patent length l). At each grid point i ∈ [1, 2, . . . ,∞), we computed U [l = i] and
dU z[l = i] ≡ U z[l = i]−U z[l = i−1], z ∈ {n, s,M} using the same baseline parameter values, as in
Table 1, plus another baseline β parameter value, which we chose to be 0.875 in order to reflect the
aggregate welfare importance of product diﬀerentiation.41 We reported the computational results
in Figure 2.
Figure 2 present tradeoﬀs between the marginal welfare gain (= dUn) and the marginal welfare
loss (= dU s + dUM ) for the patent term running from 13 to 30 years. As indicated, the optimal
patent length is about equal to 18 years at which extending the patent term results in a marginal
gain (measured by distance a) from faster innovation approximately oﬀset by the marginal loss
40Note that dUMdl =
dUM/price
dl +
dUM/cost
dl .41To make sense of the quantitative implication of the β parameter, consider (14), which can be interpreted as the
discounted present value of the log-flow of “eﬀective” aggregate consumption ￿C ≡ C/nβ/(ε−1). In general, we can use
ln ￿C1− ln ￿C0 as an approximation to the percent change in ￿C when the economy switches from scenario 0 to scenario
1. Having noticed this and from (29a), we can interpret dUn ≈ Un1 −Un0 = (1−β)(g1−g0)(ε−1)ρ2 as the percent change in the
discounted present value of the “eﬀective” aggregate consumption that is attributed to product innovation, when the
innovation rate is changed from g0 to g1. Suppose that g1 − g0 = 0.01, given the baseline parameter values (ε = 1.2,
ρ = 0.04, β = 0.875). Then from (29a), the one-percentage point increase in the innovation rate will result in a 391%
increase in the “eﬀective” aggregate consumption that is attributed to product innovation in present-value terms. If
β were reduced to 0.5, the resulting percent increase in the innovation-induced eﬀective aggregate consumption would
sharply raise to 1, 563%. If β were further reduced to 0.1, the percent increase would explode to 2, 813%. To begin
with, we therefore consider β = 0.875 more empirically plausible than β = 0.5 or 0.1.
27
Patent
Length
ψ = 0.80 ψ = 0.90 ψ = 1
(benchmark)
ψ = 1.10 ψ = 1.20
l 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23
l∗ 17.96 18.13 18.35 18.60 18.85
(a) Eﬀects of changes in ψ (coeﬃcient of creative destruction): as ψ is increased, the world calls for a
longer optimal patent length, but l stays intact.
Patent
Length
φ = 0.80 φ = 0.90 φ = 1
(benchmark)
φ = 1.10 φ = 1.20
l 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23
l∗ 18.64 18.49 18.35 18.22 18.10
(b) Eﬀects of changes in φ (coeﬃcient of research congestion/patent race): as φ is increased, the world
calls for a shorter optimal patent length, but l stays intact.
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis: optimal patent length and changes in ψ, φ.
(measured by distance b) from both increased research intensity and increased net monopoly dis-
tortion. Note that both the marginal gain and marginal loss of extending the patent life are seen
to diminish with the patent length. This is exactly consistent with Proposition 1 of Subsection 3.3
4.3 Golden section search and sensitivity analysis
The above marginal analysis was conducted on a discrete domain in l. This is good for illustrative
purposes. Henceforth, we switch to a continuous domain in l in order to see whether or not the
optimal patent length is sensitive to the chosen values of some parameters of interest. To this
end, we use an algorithm known as “Golden Section Search” to compute the optimal patent length
l∗ ∈ (l,∞) that maximizes the objective function U [l] = U [g[l], ζMp [l]] given by (28), subject to the
steady-state system defined by (26a) and (26b) along with the lower bound l determined by (27).
The golden section search algorithm, coded with the open-source Python programming lan-
guage, is introduced in Kiusalaas (2010, pp. 376-379). This algorithm involves the “bracketing”
of the optimal patent term l∗ in an closed interval like [a, b] ￿ (l,∞) and the so-called “golden
section telescoping” to iteratively narrow the closed interval that bracket l∗ until the length of the
bracketing interval is reduced to an error tolerance.42 Using the golden section search, we found
42Since the patent term l does not directly enter the objective function, I extended Kiusalaas’s Python code to fit
in my model’s constrained maximization problem. The extended Python code is available upon request.
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Patent
Length
ε = 1.13 ε = 1.18 ε = 1.23
(benchmark)
ε = 1.28 ε = 1.33
l 8.89 10.05 11.23 12.43 13.68
l∗ 1070.00 26.77 18.35 15.52 13.83
(a) Eﬀects of changes in ε (individual importance of product diﬀerentiation): as ε is increased (i.e.
smaller individual importance), an active R&D sector requires a longer minimum patent length, but
the world calls for a shorter optimal patent length.
Patent
Length
β = .845 β = .865 β = .875
(benchmark)
β = .885 β = .905
l 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23
l∗ 1070.45 21.38 18.35 15.96 12.16
(b) Eﬀects of changes in β (inverse of aggregate importance of product diﬀerentiation): as β is in-
creased, the world calls for a smaller optimal patent length, but l stays intact.
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis: optimal patent length and changes in ε and β
that the world’s optimal patent length equals 18.35 years (actually, not far away from the 18 years
term approximated earlier on a discrete domain on l) under the baseline parameter values; see
Table 1. We conducted three sets of sensitivity analysis to see how the optimal patent length l∗
will respond to changes in some parameter values:
(i) The first set of sensitivity analysis looks at the two parameters (ψ, φ) that aﬀect the hazard
of creative destruction and the prevalence of research congestion/patent races. The results are
summarized in Table 3 including panels 3a and 3b. Inspection of these results implies that the
optimal patent length for the world may range from 17 to 19 years. We see that the hazard
of creative destruction tends to lengthen the optimal patent term, but to the contrary, but the
prevalence of patent races tends to shorten it. These interesting findings make intuitive sense: the
hazard of creative destruction reduces a patented firm’s expected monopoly duration and therefore
calls for a longer optimal patent term, while the prevalence of research congestion/patent races
raises the social cost of increased research intensity and therefore calls for a shorter optimal patent
term.
(ii) However, from the second set of sensitivity analysis, summarized in Table 4, the optimal
patent length appears sensitive to both ε (elasticity of substitution between goods) and β (aggregate
welfare importance of product diﬀerentiation). From Panel 4a, if goods are more substitutable (i.e.
larger ε), the world calls for a shorter optimal patent length. This is consistent with our intuition:
too-similar goods do not deserve a longer patent life. From Panel 4b, if the world’s aggregate
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Patent
Length
θ = 4.8 θ = 4.9 θ = 5
(benchmark)
θ = 5.1 θ = 5.2
l 10.67 10.94 11.23 11.51 11.80
l∗ 18.96 18.63 18.35 18.11 17.89
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis: optimal patent length and changes in θ (inverse of research produc-
tivity). As θ is increased, an active R&D sector requires a longer minimum patent length, but the
world calls for a shorter optimal patent length.
welfare appreciates varieties of goods in a way strong enough (i.e. smaller β), the optimal patent
term can surprisingly extend beyond even 1,000 years! For instance, at β = 0.845, l∗is as great as
1070.45 years. To the contrary, if innovative goods are only tailored to some aﬄuent regions (say,
developed countries), then the world’s aggregate welfare may not appreciate varieties of goods as
much (i.e. larger β).43 For instance, if β is as large as 0.905, the world may call for an optimal
patent length as low as 12.16 years.
(iii) The third set of sensitivity analysis, summarized in Table 5 examines the role of research
productivity parameter θ. From equation (4), this parameter, along with φ and g, determines the
value of µ = θ/(1 − φg), an inverse measure of R&D productivity, or equivalently, a measure of
R&D cost (see (5) & (26a)). Also, recall that µg determines the modeled economy’s R&D intensity,
with population normalized to unity (see footnote 38). As expected, if labor is less productive in
innovating activities (i.e. larger θ), the world requires a longer minimum patent length to keep an
active R&D sector. However, a larger value of θ is also meant to raise the economy’s R&D intensity,
ceteris paribus, thereby decreasing steady-state welfare through the saving channel according to
(29b) and therefore calling for a shorter optimal patent length to counter the force to raise R&D
intensity for the modeled economy.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper has used a R&D-based endogenous growth model, where product innovation makes more
horizontally diﬀerentiated goods available to consumers, in order to study the relationships between
patent length, pace of innovation, and aggregate welfare. The model was calibrated to a global
economy with a population normalized to unity, and computational simulations were conducted
43See Grinols and Lin (1997, 2006) for the North-South growth model where Northern innovations are tailored to
either Northern or Southern consumers.
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to demonstrate the quantitative aspects of the world’s socially optimal patent length. From the
simulations, extending the patent length can enhance the pace of innovation, but this is accompanied
by an increase in the hazard rate facing incumbent patented firms, on one hand, and by an increase
in the economy’s R&D intensity via increased wastes of resources arising from research congestion,
or patent race, or the like, on the other hand. This paper has therefore demonstrated that extending
the patent length can incur a larger opportunity cost to society in terms of the eﬀective cost of
capital and the entire economy’s research intensity, as compared to previous work on patent policy,
innovation, and aggregate welfare.
Applying the golden section search algorithm, the present study computed the socially optimal
patent length for the calibrated model, despite that patent is always not Pareto eﬃcient due the
monopoly distortions. Its computational simulations demonstrated how the optimal patent length
for a global economy is subject to the innovation-caused hazard rate, the prevalence of research
congestion, and the aggregate welfare importance of product diﬀerentiation. These computational
analysis and findings can be a valuable supplement to the patent policy literature, and highlight that
WTO’s eﬀort to promote a uniform patent length of twenty years for the world may be debatable.
The present paper is concentrated in patent length, as there is little work attempting to quantify
an economy’s optimal patent length in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. It does not
address the optimization of patent breadth (or patent scope), which also have eﬀects on a patented
firm’s monopoly power and an economy’s aggregate innovation pace. A recent work by Chu (2011)
studies the welfare cost of one-size-fit-all patent breadth protection under an infinite patent-length
system, using a two-sector quality-ladder growth model. From Chu’s work, diﬀerentiating patent
breadth protection across sectors can generate welfare gains. Certainly, if the model of the present
paper extends to allow for multiple diﬀerentiated-goods sectors as in the real world, the one-size-
fit-all patent length protection must be inferior to optimizing individual patent lengths to sectoral
characteristics.
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Appendix
A Derivation of steady-state equilibrium condition
Note that the equilibrium value of a newly established patented firm equals v[t, t] = v[t] =
θw[t]
(1−φg[t])n[t] for which the present time t is the same as the vintage of the patent (i.e., τ = t).
Any firm with monopoly power earns the profit flow π[t] = (α− 1)w[t] ·xMp [t] at a time. Using (19)
to replace xMp [t], the steady-state profit flow is derived as follows
π[t] =
 (α− 1)w￿
ζMp + (1− ζMp )αε
￿
￿L− θg1− φg
￿￿ 1
n[t]
￿
(A.1)
where the second line holds due to g[t] = g, ζMp [t] = ζMp , and w[t] = w in steady state. Using (A.1)
and (11), the steady-state value of a vintage-τ patent at time t is given by
v[t, τ ] =
 (α− 1)w￿
ζMp + (1− ζMp )αε
￿
￿L− θg1− φg
￿ˆ τ+l
t
e−
´ s
t (ρ+h)dω 1
n[s]ds
= 1
n[t]
 (α− 1)w￿
ζMp + (1− ζMp )αε
￿
￿L− θg1− φg
￿ˆ τ+l
t
e−
´ s
t (ρ+h+g)dωds
= 1
n[t] (α− 1)w
￿
1
ζMp + (1− ζMp )αε
￿￿
L− θg1− φg
￿￿1− e−(ρ+h+g)(τ+l−t)
r + h+ g
￿
(A.2)
Letting τ = t in (A.2), imposing boundary condition (13a) on v[t, t] and eliminating the w term
and the n term on each side of the resulting equation, we obtain (26a) in the text.
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B Derivation of lifetime Utility Components
Noting that E = 1, C = E/P , P = w · n− 1ε−1 · ϕ from (20a), and w = E/
￿
ξ ·
￿
L− θg1−φg
￿￿
from
(24), we can derive the lifetime utility components as follows:
U =
∞ˆ
0
e−ρt log[n[t]−β/(ε−1)]dt+
∞ˆ
0
e−ρt log E[t]
P [t]dt
=
∞ˆ
0
e−ρt log[n[t]−β/(ε−1)]dt−
∞ˆ
0
e−ρt log[w[t] · n[t]− 1ε−1 · ϕ[t]]dt
=
∞ˆ
0
e−ρt log[n[t](1−β)/(ε−1)]dt−
∞ˆ
0
e−ρt log[ϕ[t]]dt+
∞ˆ
0
e−ρt log[L− θg[t]1− φg[t] ]dt+
∞ˆ
0
e−ρt log[ξ[t]]dt
In steady state, g[t] = g, ζMp [t] = ζMp , n[t] = n[0]egt, ϕ[t] = ϕ from (20a) and ξ[t] = ξ in terms of
(25). Noting these, the above lifetime utility components can lead to (29a)-(29d).
.
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